Background and Motivation
In the literature, labels are modeled as a solution to the market failure of credence goods. Credence goods are often goods with process-related attributes (i.e. GMOs, food safety, and environmental attributes) and thus involve informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers as to their quality. Buyers can seldom verify process attributes. Labels are modeled as a way of restoring informational symmetry. In this paper, we move away from this theoretical framework and argue that, even in the presence of a label, markets for credence goods may still be inefficient. We model credence goods as goods with quality information costs borne by consumers. The objective of the paper is to determine the impact of varying levels of quality information costs on market efficiency and on sellers' and buyers' behavior. Additionally, we test the role of self-declared labeling and reputation effects to restore market efficiency in such a context. We apply the paper to eco-friendly products. Eco-labeling is a market-driven policy tool aiming to internalize the external effects of production, consumption and disposal of products on the environment. For example, the US "Green Seal" eco-label describes its mission as 'encouraging and assisting individuals and corporations in protecting the environment by identifying those products that are less harmful to the planet than other similar products'.
1 In 2009, the Global Ecolabelling Network reports 25 eco-labeling programs developed by member organizations accounting for more than 29,000 certified products and services around the world. While the polls frequently report consumers' willingness to pay for eco-labeled products, little evidence exists as to the actual ability of eco-labels to impact on purchase behavior. Notable exceptions are the empirical results of Teisl et al. (2002) , Bjørner et al. (2004) and Dhar and Foltz (2005) which respectively show that the "dolphin safe" label on tuna, the Nordic Swan label on toilet paper and the organic label on milk have an impact on consumer behavior. These results show the potential impacts of eco-labeling. The environmental attributes of goods relate to process attributes. Because of the informational asymmetry between sellers and consumers, the markets for eco-friendly goods are subject to the lemon problem (Akerlof, 1970) . Formally, eco-labels are modeled as tools that help mitigate informational asymmetry in relation to the environmental quality of a product (see, for example, Cason and Gangadharan, 2002; Caswell and Mojduzska, 1996; Kirchhoff, 2000; Teisl and Roe, 1998 ). These papers model credence goods problems as informational asymmetry problems. In our article, we model ecofriendly goods as goods with quality information costs borne by consumers.
The originality of the paper is twofold. (i) We draw implication of the presence of information quality costs for labeling design. We show that the design of labels can entail more or less information quality cost and underline the need for a careful design of labels. In the case of eco-labeling, we model environmental attributes of goods as attributes that are costly to verify. In the absence of a label, consumers rely on several proxies to get information on product environmental quality. But, even in the presence of an eco-label, consumers still search for information on the meaning and credibility of the information provided by the label so that consumers still bear information costs. 2 Modeling the market for eco-friendly goods as a market with information costs on goods' quality allows us to take account of the information search behavior of consumers. We also test for the effect of self-declared labels on market efficiency and consumer information demand. Besides, we also test for reputation effect in asymmetric markets as in previous literature and consider distributional issues. (ii) We provide an empirical test of the effect of quality information costs on market efficiency. Such markets have been modeled theoretically (Bester and Ritzberger, 2001; Kihlstrom, 1974) but to our knowledge, there is no empirical test of the theoretical propositions. It is difficult in surveys to control for the level of information cost on quality because this cost may vary among individuals. Experiments in the lab enable to test our hypotheses. The environment is controlled and variables such as information costs are accurately known.
We find that a low information cost (10% of consumer's willingness to pay for high quality products) introduces a friction not high enough to lead to adverse selection whereas a high cost environment (around 66% of consumer's willingness to pay for high quality products) drives out high quality products. We find that allowing for reputation in an asymmetric information market does not enhance market efficiency as a whole but that sellers are better off whereas buyers loose. We find self-declared labels in markets with high information costs have a positive effect on market efficiency and on the probability of sellers' proposing high quality products but it also has distributional effects (only sellers benefit from self-declared labels). According to Kihlstrom (1974) , demand for information on product quality is a derived demand for products. We find that demand for information follows the classic law of demand and that it is a non linear function of product price as theoretically expected (Bester and Ritzberger, 2001) . We also find that the probability of purchasing information on quality when its costs are high decreases when sellers use self-declared labels: either buyers use self-declared labels as an information-revelation device, or feedback on reputational effects is a substitute for information demand.
Our paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we present the information costs associated with the environmental attributes of goods, and we examine the theoretical and experimental literature on markets with information asymmetry and on markets with quality information costs; we discuss the relevant experimental evidence in detail. In section 3, we detail the experimental framework and the theoretical predictions. In Section 4, we present our results and discuss them. Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes.
Eco-labeling, Quality Information Costs and Related Literature
In this section, we present the different types of eco-labels and their link with information quality costs and market efficiency. Next, we review the economics literature on informational asymmetry, quality information costs and selfdeclaration.
Modeling credence goods as goods with quality information costs: application to eco-labeling
Information economics classifies goods into three categories -search, experience and credence. Nelson (1970) drew on Stigler (1961) to define a search good as a good for which consumers can inspect the alternatives before purchasing (for example, trying on clothes before purchase). The author introduces a category of goods called experience goods for which consumers evaluate the good through purchase rather than through search. Consuming the good reveals information on the product quality. The cost of searching for information on quality is higher than the price of the good (for example, evaluation of the taste of several brands of tuna). To choose from among several products, consumers prefer to buy information by way of experience -that is, by purchasing the product -until the marginal cost of the information becomes superior to its marginal return. Darby and Karni (1973) broadened this classification. They added a third type, credence goods, whereby quality is expensive to judge even after purchase, so that information about product quality is costly to the consumer. This classification of goods or characteristics into these three types has been taken further by several authors (Ford et al., 1988; Krouse, 1990, p. 510; Andersen and Philipsen, 1998; Cho and Hooker, 2002) who focused on the cost of getting information on product quality rather than on the moment when consumers become informed (before or after purchase, or neither). Goods can thus be considered as distributed according to the level of quality information costs. At one extreme, there are perfect search goods (where information costs are nil) and at the other, credence goods (where information costs are prohibitive). Ecolabeled products usually fall into the category of credence goods, and quality information costs relating to environmental attributes are rarely low for consumers.
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The ISO14000 standard defines three types of eco-labels. Type II ecolabels are self-declared labels whereas types I and III are certified by a third party. Type I eco-labels are binary informational tools. In this type of eco-label, the information is relative (good for the environment or not, as compared to other similar products) and the scoring is performed as part of the eco-labeling program, whereas type III eco-labels give absolute information, with varying degrees of detail, about the impact of the product itself on the environment. In type III labels, the scoring is left to the consumer. It follows that the type of label will have an effect on buyers' costs for quality information as described hereafter.
In the absence of an eco-label, consumers decide to invest a certain amount of their resources to search for information on the environmental quality of the product. The amount invested depends on individual parameters like prior level of knowledge, access to information, and ability to process the information. The introduction of eco-labels is new information that may or may not lower the cost of searching for information. The information that eco-labels convey still has to be analyzed, understood and believed.
We identify three potential sources of quality information costs in the presence of an eco-label (Bougherara and Grolleau, 2004; Karl and Orwat, 1999) .
First, consumers may incur definition costs. Environmental criteria are not set by market demand, unlike other attributes of goods. The consumer does not define what is good for the environment. Rather, the promoters of eco-labels are quality-makers. The environmental criteria are set by the seller (type II eco-labels) or are the outcome of a negotiation between several interested parties (such as firms, the government, NGOs, consumer organizations, etc) (most type I and III eco-labels). The endogeneity of environmental quality to the eco-labeling process is due to the consumers' inability to define what an environmentally-friendly product is. The issue addressed here has nothing to do with verification as described in the following paragraph (Plott and Wilde, 1982) . A buyer may verify that a farmer has maintained hedgerows but she may lack the expert ability to know whether this is good for the environment.
The second type of quality costs are the most commonly referred to. They are the verifying costs; that is, the resources invested by buyers to check that the seller has done what he claims. Because of the properties of credence goods, buyers can seldom verify the claims. Even if there are certifying devices (type I and III eco-labels), these may seem more or less credible to the buyer, who may or may not invest in a costly search for more information on product quality.
The third category of quality information costs pertains to signaling (Wynne, 1994) . Suppose there are no definition costs and no verifying costs. Buyers still have to analyze the label they are provided with. If we assume consumers have limited cognitive abilities, the label format may entail costs to buyers. Some labels convey simple yes-or-no information (type I eco-labels) whereas others are detailed lifecycle analyses indicating the environmental impacts of the product at each step of the lifecycle and for each environmental field (some type III eco-labels). The former are less costly for buyers to analyze than the latter.
Modeling eco-labeled products as products with quality information costs gives a different perspective to the analysis of eco-labeling as a policy tool. It is already apparent that label design will have an important role in shaping quality information costs, which in turn have an impact on market efficiency.
Literature on information asymmetry relating to product quality
The theory of information asymmetry in seller-buyer relationships has been extensively studied (see section 2.1.). In this section, we first review a number of experimental papers that deal with adverse selection issues. Then we review the literature on consumer information costs relating to product quality, and last, we address the literature on self-declared labeling.
Experimental literature on information asymmetry
The experimental literature initially focused on information asymmetries in markets, 4 addressing several questions. Plott and Wilde (1982) look at market efficiency when buyers must rely upon the sellers' recommendation for the purchase of a service. Buyers then shop for competing sellers' diagnosis at no cost before choosing the seller they will buy the service from. The hypothesis of a no-cost diagnosis is strong. The authors show that competition between sellers reduces the incentives for sellers to take advantage of consumers and increases market efficiency. Miller and Plott (1985) study the effect on the market equilibrium of costly signaling by sellers. The seller type is exogenously determined and sellers can engage in costly signaling where signaling is costlier for low-quality sellers than for high-quality sellers. The market leads to a separating equilibrium only if the signal cost difference between high-and low-quality sellers is big enough. Regarding markets with adverse selection, Lynch et al. (1991; 1986) deal with mechanisms revealing information about the seller type after purchase. Information revelation to all participants (public) is more efficient than information revelation to each buyer (private). The sellers' reputation-building has no effect on the adverse selection outcome. Binding commitments by sellers mitigate adverse selection whereas self-declared commitments do not. In one treatment, the authors revealed information about the seller type only after several trading periods (close to a credence good) instead of revealing information right after the exchange (experience good). But this did not yield significant differences. Lastly, Cason and Gangadharan (2002) study the effect of reputation, self-declaration and certification on market efficiency. Reputation and self-declaration increase market efficiency, although not as much as certification.
Most experimental articles we reviewed address experience goods. Only two papers deal with credence goods. Plott and Wilde (1982) study the definition problem and Lynch et al. (1991) study the verification issue. In our article, we look at markets with quality information costs, including definition, verification and signaling issues.
Literature on consumer information costs relating to product quality
The theoretical literature on consumer quality information costs is surprisingly scarce. The seminal paper of Kihlstrom (1974) offers a general theory of consumer demand for information on quality. Demand for information is a derived demand. Information on quality is purchased only because there is a demand for another good (the product for which information is demanded). Additionally, information demand occurs only when the product quality is uncertain.
Drawing on the model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Bester and Ritzberger (2001) model quality information demand as a dynamic game with complete information. Sellers are of two types: high quality H q and low quality L q . Buyers know the probability of a seller being of a high quality type [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ l and the probability of a seller being of a low quality type ) 1 ( l − . Buyers observe the product price and then decide whether or not to buy information on product quality at a cost 0 > k . The market equilibrium is a function of the buyers' beliefs and under some hypotheses, the lower the quality information cost, the lower the probability that agents will invest in quality information.
The experimental literature deals with markets with costs relating to information on product prices (Brannon and Gorman, 2002) but to our knowledge, no experimental article has studied markets with information costs on product quality.
Literature on self-declared labeling
In the theory, self-declared labels (Type II) are sometimes referred to as "cheap talk" because of the absence of certification mechanisms. Cheap talk is defined as a message from a sender to a receiver that has no direct effect on payoffs. Cheap talk is expected to have no effect on market efficiency when the interests of the sender and the interests of the receiver diverge sufficiently (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell and Rabin, 1996) . Environmental self-declared messages by the sender (the seller) cannot reveal truthful information to the receiver (the buyer) because, for a given price, the seller's payoff decreases with the product quality whereas the buyers' payoff increases with the product quality. Given the divergence of interests between sellers and buyers, cheap talk cannot reveal truthful information in the case of eco-labels.
However, self-declared eco-labels are often different from cheap talk in that they may have a direct effect on payoffs when reputational effects are allowed; the messages contained in self-declared eco-labels may then reveal truthful information because of the threat of reputational effects (being found to be lying). In the presence of quality information costs and reputational effects, we expect self-declared eco-labels to have a positive effect on market efficiency.
The experimental literature on cheap-talk and reputation has been reviewed in the previous section on informational asymmetry and shows that the experimental effect of reputation and self-declaration is not clear-cut. In this paper we test these effects in relation to quality information costs.
As a conclusion to section 2, we may say that there is a gap in the experimental literature as regards testing the effect of quality information costs on market efficiency and consumer demand for information, and that a "counteracting institution" (Akerlof, 1970) such as self-declaration has not been tested in such a context. This is precisely the aim of our study.
Experimental Protocol and Theoretical Predictions
The aim of this section is to present the experimental setting and the theoretical predictions for each treatment in the experiment before turning to the results.
Experimental setting 5
We use an experimental protocol similar to Cason and Gangadharan's (2002) and Lynch et al.'s (1991) . The reader can refer to these papers for a detailed description. 132 students from ENESAD (Dijon, France) and Université de Rennes I (Rennes, France) participated in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to a role of seller or buyer. There were 5 sellers and 6 buyers. We carried out 12 sessions. All sessions except one have 32 trading periods. Gains were in experimental currency units (ECU) during the experiment and were converted to Euros at the end of the session. The conversion rate was private information and differed between sellers and buyers (1 ECU = 0.004 Euros for sellers and 1 ECU = 0.013 Euros for buyers). Average earnings were 30 Euros.
The timing of the game in each period was the following one: 1. At the beginning of each period, each seller chooses the quality (Regular or Super) of the units she offers on the market and commits to a price offer p. Sellers offer a maximum of two units of the same quality. 2. Each buyer observes the price offers of each seller presented in a random order (except in the Rep and the Self treatment, see section 3.2.) but he does not observe quality. Each buyer decides about whether to become informed about the quality of the products offered by one or several of the sellers by paying k per inspected product (except in treatment Ref and Rep, see section 3.2.) 3. Each buyer decides whether to purchase up to three units, taking turn in a random order. The period ends when there are no units left to sell or when all buyers have taken their turn. Gains are computed. The information on gains are communicated to sellers but not to buyers (except in periods 1 to 4, in period 8, in period 16 and in period 32, see section 3.2.).
It is public information that Supers are more expensive to produce than Regulars and that buyers' resale values for Supers are more than for Regulars. The exact production costs are private information for sellers and the exact resale values are private information for buyers. Production costs are 120ECU for Supers and 20ECU for Regulars. The marginal value of the Supers is always greater than for Regulars. The value of the first unit of Super is 330ECU, 300ECU for the second unit, and 270ECU for the third unit. The value of the first unit of Regular is 180ECU, 165ECU for the second unit, and 150 ECU for the third unit. Buyers' willingness to pay for Supers over Regulars is 120 to 150ECU. The market demand and supply functions are shown in Figure 1 . There are two equilibria. In the efficient equilibrium, Supers are delivered at a price of 300ECU and ten units are traded, resulting in a total surplus of 1980ECU. 6 In the inefficient equilibrium, only Regulars are traded at a price of 165ECU and 10 units are traded, resulting in a total surplus of 1540ECU.
7 Trading efficiency in the inefficient Regulars equilibrium is therefore 1540/1980=0.778. In addition to gains from the units bought, buyers receive a bonus of 50ECU each period and a starting balance of 200ECU at the beginning of the session. These bonus payments helped keep monetary incentives during the session especially when buyers incur high losses at the beginning of the session. In each session, there was an outside option: buyers could choose not to purchase from any seller and earn 10ECU. 6 For buyers, 6 units with a 330ECU resale value are traded at a 300ECU price yielding a surplus of (330-300)x6=180ECU and 4 units with a 300ECU resale value are traded at a 300ECU price yielding no surplus (300-300)x4=0ECU. The surplus for buyers is 180ECU. For sellers, 10 units with a 120ECU production cost are traded at a 300ECU price yielding a surplus of (300-120)x10=1800ECU. The total surplus at the efficient equilibrium is 180+1800=1980ECU. 7 For buyers, 6 units with a 180ECU resale value are traded at a 165ECU price yielding a surplus of (180-165)x6=90ECU and 4 units with a 165ECU resale value are traded at a 165ECU price yielding no surplus (165-165)x4=0ECU. The surplus for buyers is 90ECU. For sellers, 10 units with a 20ECU production cost are traded at a 165ECU price yielding a surplus of (165-20)x10=1450ECU. The total surplus at the efficient equilibrium is 90+1450=1540ECU.
Treatments
We design 5 treatments ( ) and where buyers can identify sellers from one period to the other 10 with the High treatment. In the experimental sessions, a credence good was traded. As such, information about quality could not be revealed after each trading period. A perfect credence good experimental market would require information on quality to be revealed either through information purchase by buyers when possible (as in the High, Low and Self treatments) or at the end of the experiment only. Implementing such a protocol would be a good modeling in the lab of credence goods but we feared loosing the incentive compatibility needed for the experimental approach. This constituted a constraint on the modeling of credence goods in the lab. We decided we would train the subjects on incentive compatibility during the first periods and then increase little by little the number of periods before getting any information on quality. Experimental participants had to be trained and their incentives to play maintained. We could not keep the information asymmetry during 32 periods. We organized the sessions in four blocks. In the first block (periods 1 to 4), information on quality was revealed after each trading period to train the participants. In the second block (5 to 8), 8 Treatment Rep was designed at first to test for reputation effects where information costs are high. In that case, Rep should have been compared with High. Because of a mistake, Rep treatment was carried out with a complete information asymmetry. Despite that mistake, we report results on the Rep treatment for two reasons. First, we wanted to compare our results on credence goods with results of previous experimental economics papers on experience goods. Second, we consider distributional issues (sellers vs. buyers) that were left out in previous experimental economics papers. 9 Sellers do not incur any signaling cost in the Self treatment. When there are signaling costs, the difference in signaling costs between high quality sellers and low quality sellers is of course a determinant of the existence of a separating or a pooling equilibrium. Here, we only deal with "cheap talk" signaling and leave out certification (costly signal). 10 In Low and High treatments, buyers do not benefit from the information purchased from one period to another. However, when reputation effects are allowed as in Self treatment, the information purchased in one period can be used as a signal for quality offered in later periods.
information was revealed at period 8 only. In the third block (9 to 16), information was revealed at period 16 only. In the last block (17 to 32), information was revealed at period 32 only. * as a share of buyers' maximum willingness to pay for an S unit as compared to an R unit that is 150 ECU 
Information cost

Theoretical predictions
The literature review enables us to draw theoretical predictions as to the effect of information costs, reputation and self-declaration on market efficiency and on demand for information on quality.
Market efficiency and probability of offering type S units
Two predictions can be formulated as regards market efficiency and probability of offering type S units. First, we expect treatment Low to be similar to a perfect information model where the equilibrium for S units occurs for a price equal to 300 and the equilibrium for R units occurs at a price equal to 165. Thus, only S units are traded because sellers' profits and buyer's profits are higher than for R units. "As the information cost becomes negligible, the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly informative" Ritzberger, 2001, p.1360) . Second, we expect the Ref treatment and the High treatment to lead to adverse selection where only R units are traded at a price equal to 165. This is the lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970) . The Rep treatment allows buyers to identity the sellers from one period to the other in a market with informational asymmetry. Buyers have information only on prices and not on quality. Sellers have no incentive to offer high quality units. Repeated purchase mechanisms (Klein and Leffler, 1981) cannot take place. Theoretically, reputation will have no effect at all on market efficiency and on the probability of offering type S units.
On the contrary, we expect that allowing for reputation effects and for selfdeclaration in the Self treatment will increase market efficiency because buyers can check for quality by purchasing costly information, and they can punish cheating sellers in future trading periods ("counteracting institution").
Information demand on quality
The predictions on information demand on product's quality is a function of information costs but also of product's price (derived demand). The effect of information costs is expected to be in line with the law of demand whereby demand for information decreases with its cost. The effect of product price on information demand is less straightforward. We use the model of Bester and Ritzberger (2001) .
Let u be the buyer's outside option payoff, ( ) p μ the buyer conditional probability of seller type S given the price p , V the buyer redemption value ( R V if R unit and S V if S unit). The buyer's expected payoff from not testing for the quality is:
(1 ( )). , ]
The informed buyer purchases the good if V p u − ≥ . Let k be the information cost. Therefore, the expected payoff from becoming informed is:
Two cases appear. (i) If
S u V p
> − , it is always optimal not to buy the unit.
Buyers will not invest in information. In our experiment, becoming informed is higher than the expected payoff from not testing for the quality:
We know that R S V u p V u − < < − . Thus, the preceding expression can be written:
(1 ( )).
(1 ( )). 
It is not possible to test this hypothesis with our data because we don't know buyers' beliefs ( )
. However, we can test for a less detailed hypothesis. Figure 2 shows the preceding predictions depending on the price of the product and on the order of purchase of the unit in the trading period. Four price thresholds can be determined from this figure: 140, 170, 260 and 320. If the price is lower than 140 or higher than 320, there is no information purchase. If the price is in the interval [170, 260] , the probability of purchasing information is higher than if the price is in the interval [260, 320] . But if the price is in the interval [260, 320] , the probability of purchasing information is higher than if the price is in the interval [140, 170] . We are thus able to predict the magnitude of the probability of information purchase as a function of product price.
How will allowing for self-declaration impact on buyers' demand for information? The Self treatment allows for sellers to declare the type of their units. As such, the information provided in this treatment will have a direct effect and an indirect effect on information demand. First, as a direct effect, self-declaration will act as a substitute for information purchase and will probably have a negative impact on consumer demand for information. Second, as an indirect effect, selfdeclaration provides buyers with information that impacts on buyers' beliefs
. Consequently, in the Self treatment, the decision rule (1) will be shifted according to the impact on ( ) p μ . Our predictions on information demand as a function of the prices intervals will not be modified.
Results
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We first present the descriptive statistics on the number of traded R and S units and on the level of market efficiency in each treatment. Then, the econometric results on market efficiency and information demand are presented and discussed. Table 2 gives the number of S and R units traded and the market efficiency in periods 5-32, in the final 10 and in the final 5 periods. It shows that the number of traded S units increases when information cost decreases (from Ref to High and from High to Low). Statistics on efficiency yield same results except for period 5-32 where efficiency is lower for Low as compared to High. Reputation (Rep) has a positive effect on the number of S units traded in the market as compared to the baseline (Ref) . But it has a negative effect on efficiency as compared to the baseline (Ref) except for periods 5-32. Self-declaration (Self) increases the number of S units traded in the market in all period intervals and increases market efficiency except in the final 10 periods as compared to the high information treatment (High).
Descriptive statistics
The following econometric analysis enables to take account of the panel structure of data and the dynamics of the market. 
∑∑ ∑∑
where i is an index for buyers, j is an index for the units bought in the period (up to 3), l is an index for sellers, and m is an index for the unit offered by sellers (up to 2).The resale value depends on the unit bought in the period (its order in the period and its type) by a given buyer i and the production cost depends on the unit sold in the period (its type) for a given seller. The price depends on the unit (its quality, the seller who offered it or the buyer who bought it). The independent variables are dummy variables for the various experimental treatments and interaction variables to capture the dynamic tendencies in the data. Following Noussair et al. (1995) , the variables 1/t and (t-1)/t allow the estimates to reflect respectively the early period effects (small t) and the long run effects (high t). We are mainly interested in the long run effects since behaviors in early periods often correspond to learning effects. Following Cason and Gangadharan (2002) where the expected profit of offering Supers (respectively Regulars) is simply equal to the profit the last time a seller offered Supers (respectively Regulars). Table 4 presents the econometrics results for the following four dependent variables and their mean and standard deviation over all treatments and all periods: market efficiency, sellers' efficiency, buyers' efficiency and the probability of offering type S units. Market efficiency (defined in table 2) is the ratio of the sum of sellers' and buyers' surpluses to the total theoretical surplus in the efficient equilibrium that is 1980ECU (see footnote 6). Sellers' efficiency is the ratio of the sum of sellers' surplus to the total theoretical surplus of sellers in the efficient equilibrium that is 1800ECU (see footnote 6). Buyers' efficiency is the ratio of the sum of buyers' surplus to the total theoretical surplus of buyers in the efficient equilibrium that is 180ECU (see footnote 6). Notice that taking into account all treatments and all periods, buyers' efficiency mean is close to zero and has a higher standard variation. This shows that buyers' gains are distributed around zero and are more dispersed than sellers' gains. The probability of offering type S units is estimated using a dummy variable equal to one when the seller has offered a Super unit and equal to zero otherwise. The reference treatment in these four econometric models is the Ref treatment. Table 5 presents the econometric results for the probability of purchasing information. The probability of purchasing information is estimated using a dummy variable equal to one when the buyer has purchased information on a given unit and equal to zero otherwise. The reference treatment in this econometric model is the Low treatment. 12 We also tried a more complex expectation model as in Cason and Gangadarhan (2002) where expected earnings were computed as follows. Consider R units. If a seller has offered R units in the (N-1) first periods and offers R units in period N, the seller revises his beliefs on expected profits according to the following formula: Table 5 : Econometric results on the probability of purchasing information on quality (a, b and c respectively mean a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level)
Econometric analysis
We present the results on the effect of information costs first and then, on the effect of reputation and self-declaration. We will comment only the long run effects. Table 4 shows the market efficiency decreases with information costs on quality. Market efficiency is significantly (1%) higher in treatment Low as compared to treatments Ref and High. Market efficiency in treatment High is not significantly different from treatment Ref. It seems there is a threshold information costs above which markets behave as if there was informational asymmetry. We do not reject our theoretical predictions about the low information costs treatment behaving as a close-to-perfect information market and the high information cost treatment behaving as a lemons market. But, the regression on sellers' efficiency and buyers' efficiency show that results are differentiated. Sellers benefit from the introduction of information cost -even in the high cost treatment-as compared to the baseline treatment whereas buyers do not benefit at all even when the information cost is small. The probability of offering type S units is higher in the Low treatment than in the High and Ref treatments. It shows that sellers have more expectations on their high quality units being traded when information costs are low. Table 5 shows that the demand for information decreases with information costs (law of demand) and that there is no linearity between demand for information and product price. The predictions on prices intervals are verified.
Testing for the effect of information cost
Testing for the effect of reputation and self-declared labels
As mentioned in the previous section, the reputation treatment enables to test for reputation effects in markets with informational asymmetry by comparing Rep and Ref. We find that reputation has no overall effect on market efficiency as theoretically predicted and like Cason and Gangadharan (2002) (see table 4 ). However, it has a differing effect on sellers and buyers. Sellers benefit from allowing for reputation whereas buyers experience a loss. It seems buyers, by considering price as a quality signal, wrongly trusted sellers, and that sellers cheated since the probability of offering S units is not significantly different in the Rep treatment as compared to the baseline treatment.
The effect of self-declaration is tested in markets with information costs on quality. We find that self-declaration has a positive effect on market efficiency as compared to the baseline and also to the high information cost treatment (see table  4 ). When information costs on quality are high, self-declaration seems to be able to mitigate market inefficiencies (higher efficiency in the Self treatment as compared to the High treatment). Two comments are in order. First, market efficiency is not as high as in treatment Low where the information cost is low. Second, self-declaration has increased sellers' efficiency but not buyers' efficiency. There are distributional issues. If we look at the last column of table 4, we see that the probability of offering type S units is higher in the Self treatment as compared to the High treatment. Sellers have increased their S unit offers but they were not traded on the market. Finally, we find that self-declaration has a negative effect on information demand (see table 5) as compared to the treatment Low. The negative impact of self-declaration is higher in absolute value than the effect of the high information cost treatment. It means that either buyers use selfdeclared labels as an information-revelation device or reputational affects feedbacks are a substitute for information demand. In any case, buyers wrongly substituted information demand (costly device for buyers) for self-declared labels (no-cost device for buyers).
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of our paper was to investigate the impact of eco-labels design on market efficiency and on consumer quality information demand. We modeled labels as information mechanisms that could entail more or less quality information costs for buyers. We also provided an empirical test on the model of Bester and Ritzberger (2001) in an experimental setting that allows for controlling information costs. Our main results are: (i) market efficiency decreases with information costs on quality, but sellers are the sole winners and even a small information cost does not enhance buyers' efficiency; (ii) allowing for reputation in an asymmetric information market does not enhance market efficiency as a whole but only for sellers whereas buyers loose for allowing for reputation effects; (iii) self-declaration increases market efficiency but only sellers are better off while buyers are indifferent; (iv) information demand is a decreasing function of its cost and a non linear function of product price; (v) self-declaration is a substitute for information purchase.
What implications can we draw from such results? First, let us consider the results concerning the effect of information costs. As mentioned earlier, the type of label (type I, II or III) and it being more or less detailed will determine the level of quality information cost. As shown by our results, even when information cost is low, buyers are no better than if there were no label if the cost is theirs to bear. Information costs on quality are a crucial determinant of eco-label success. An eco-label promoter should consider minimizing these costs. An eco-label designed to minimize quality information costs may increase market efficiency. Targeting may considerably lower information costs on quality. Two variables may impact on information costs on quality.
First, when designing the label, promoters should have the consumer target in mind. The label may target consumers whose cognitive abilities are high or whose opportunity cost of time is low to minimize information costs. Targeting consumers according to their opportunity cost of time is linked to the price discrimination literature on coupons and rebates (Narasimhan, 1984; Gerstner and Hess, 1991; Bester and Petrakis, 1996) . In this literature, coupons are used to segment consumers. Only consumers with a sufficiently low opportunity cost of time take advantage of coupons. Thus, price discrimination can be achieved through self-selection. In our paper, our implication of targeting consumers is similar. One could design a label that gives little "technical" information but points to a website where consumers with low opportunity cost of time could get more information if they want to. Targeting consumers according to their cognitive abilities could mean targeting consumers according to the store they shop at. More technical information and more objective information can probably be provided to stores such as organic foods stores. Second, labels can be targeted to certain products. For example, type III labels (no a priori scoring) may be better fit for low frequency purchases for which consumers take time to trade-off product attributes.
Let us now consider our second set of results on counteracting institutions to adverse selection such as reputation and self-declaration. As theoretically predicted and as in other experimental studies, reputation did not increase market efficiency in asymmetric markets. Environmental attributes cannot be provided through reputation building only. As for self-declaration in markets with high information costs, although the probability of offering high quality units was higher, only sellers were better off. The market was able to have high quality units traded but buyers did not benefit. Buyers wrongly substituted information demand (costly device for buyers) for self-declared labels (no-cost device for buyers). Type II labels do not provide the consumer with guarantees as to the real environmental quality improvement if definition, verification and signaling costs are high. Future research should include analyzing the effect of certification on market efficiency and consumer demand for information.
In this article, our aim was to focus on the effect of information quality costs borne solely by the buyer. However, other agents may bear such costs. The seller could use certification (as mentioned above). Consumer organizations or the state can also bear part of these costs (educational programs for example). The potential institutional arrangements are diversified and could lead to a variety of results. Future research could focus on the optimal distribution of quality information costs among agents. Another extension of our paper could be to consider heterogeneous types of information costs such as cognitive efforts, advice demand, invested time. We expect these costs to have differing impacts.
